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Abstract 
In this paper we explore the effect of innovation on income inequality using annual 
country panel data for 29 countries. We demonstrate that innovation activities 
reduce personal income inequality by matching patents from the European Patent 
Office with their inventors. Our findings are supported by instrumental variable 
estimations to tackle endogeneity. The results are also robust with respect to 
various inequality measures, alternative quality indexes of innovation, truncation 
bias, the use of patent applications together with granted patents and different ways 
to split or allocate patents.  
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1 Introduction 
    Since the famous work of Solow (1956) economists have been studying the 
issues of growth and convergence. Many years later, Mankiw et al. (1992) use cross 
country data to test the Solow model. Their empirical analysis confirms the 
implications of Solow and claims that human capital is one of the most important 
growth determinants. Currently, country and regional income disparities are still high 
on the research agenda. It has been shown that economies at similar income levels 
often share many common elements like: education levels, science and technology 
endowments, infrastructure and institutional quality (Iammarino et al., 2018). Martin 
(2002) finds that even though within-country inequality has increased, there is a 
decline in across country-income inequality. He concludes that “the best strategy to 
reduce world income inequalities is to induce aggregate economic growth in poor 
countries”. There is also a rich literature which argues that innovation is a major 
determinant of economic growth (Aghion and Howitt, 1992 and Aghion and Jaravel, 
2015). In this paper, we conclude that innovation activities reduce personal income 
inequality in a world panel of countries (see also Antonelli and Gehringer, 2017).  
    Figure 1 illustrates the trends of our measures of innovation and inequality. 
We see that innovation activity has increased since 1980. At the same time, the top 
1% income share rose, while Gini index has remained almost the same. The measure 
of innovation which increased the most was citations. Although recent studies 
criticize the role of citations as quality measure of innovation (Kelly et al., 2018) it 
still remains one of the most popular measures of quality patents.  
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[Insert Figure 1 here] 
    In Figure 2 we present a scatter plot of the log differences of citation years and 
top 1% income share. The countries
1
 with the red label have experienced an increase 
in citations per capita and at the same time a drop in their top 1% income share. Five 
of these eight countries, belong to the top fifteen most innovative countries based on 
Table 2. This evidence and the work of Aghion et al. (2018) about top income 
inequality in USA have inspired us to test the effect of innovation on top income 
inequality at the country level using a world sample. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
    In this paper, we conclude that innovation is negatively associated with 
personal income inequality. We apply the same methodology with Aghion et al. 
(2018) with two differences: i) our sample contains countries instead of US states ii) 
we use patents from EPO, while they use patents from USPTO. Initially, we use OLS 
regressions with country and year fixed effects to explore this relationship across 
different countries over time. We also apply instrumental variable estimations to 
check the robustness of our basic results and confirm that causality runs from 
innovation to income inequality. Our main contributions in the literature are three. 
First, we contribute to the literature on inequality and growth by studying innovation 
as a channel linking the two (Aghion and Howitt, 1992 and Benos and Karagiannis, 
2018). Second, we enrich the research on innovation and income inequality by 
including many different measures of both innovation and income inequality (Aghion 
                                                          
1
 These countries are: USA, Japan, Australia, France, United Kingdom, Denmark, Russian Federation 
and Malaysia. 
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at el., 2018). Third, we identify an innovation network through citations based on the 
location of the inventors for the period 1978-1985. This knowledge based instrument 
helps us to tackle the endogeneity problem. Four papers are close to our work: the 
paper of Antonelli C. and Gehringer A. (2017), Risso and Carrera (2018), Wlodarczyk 
(2017) and Permana et al., (2018). Only Antonelli C. and Gehringer A. (2017) state 
that innovation may reduce income inequality
2
. We distinguish our paper from them 
by using quality measures of innovation
3
 and in addition two different instruments to 
deal with endogeneity. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to present robust 
evidence according to which there is a causal effect of innovation on income 
inequality at the country level. 
    The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explores the relations 
between innovation and income distribution. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 
shows the empirical strategy. Section 5 discusses the results and Section 6 concludes. 
2 Theoretical framework 
2.1 Innovation and Regional Inequality 
    According to many studies innovation has a positive effect on income 
inequality using regional data. First, there is the productivity effect which boosts 
wages of employees who work in innovative firms (Lee, 2011). These firms are able 
to develop new products and as a result new jobs are created (Breau et al., 2014). The 
                                                          
2
 As we explain in the section 2, the other studies find positive results (Permana et al., 2018) or 
contradictory results for different measures of innovation (Wlodarczyk, 2017) or contradictory results 
for different amounts of the same measure of innovation (Risso and Carrera, 2018). 
3
 Quality measures of innovations as citations capture the true impact of patents (Aghion at el., 2018). 
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new jobs require advanced technologies suitable only for high skilled employees and 
this impact shows up in their salaries (Lee, 2011 and Breau et al., 2014). Also, 
innovative regions lure highly skilled and highly paid workers (Lee, 2011). Paas 
(2012) use GDP per capita in 2007 at the NUTS 2 level as explanatory variable and 
human capital indicators
4
, patent applications and R&D expenditures as independent 
variables. The cross region analysis shows that innovation has significant role in 
explaining regional income disparities between the EU NUTS2 regions. 
    The effect of innovation is stronger on top income shares than the rest of the 
income distribution (Aghion et al., 2018). According to them, innovation from both 
incumbents and entrants increases top income inequality. The difference between 
incumbents and entrants is that incumbents erect barriers. The barriers discourage new 
entrants and boost top income inequality. Pollak (2014) shows that incumbent firms 
defend their leading position by innovating at a high rate. His endogenous growth 
model justifies a persistent high growth rate by raising R&D intensity. This procedure 
stops only when the profits of the incumbent company fall.  
    Aghion et al. (2018) propose an additional channel through which innovation 
affects top income inequality. This channel is capital gains. The source of capital 
gains is the award for the innovative companies (mark-up). They indicate that through 
mark-up the companies have managed to increase their profits during the past forty 
years. Entrepreneurs and CEOs earn the bigger share of profits. 
                                                          
4
 The human capital indicators are: Human resources in science and technology, population with 
tertiary education, participation in life-long learning and employment in knowledge-intensive services. 
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    There are empirical findings, which confirm all above arguments. Lee (2011) 
uses data from the European Community Household Panel for the period 1995-2001 
and finds that innovation has a positive effect on income inequality. Aghion et al. 
(2018) conclude that innovation drives top income inequality and not the opposite in 
US states by applying IV regressions. The results are similar for Canadian cities 
(Breau et al., 2014). In addition, innovation increases the inter-city inequality. Berkes 
and Gaetani (2018) explore the effect of innovation on income segregation within 
commuting zones
5
. Their main hypothesis is whether CZs that experience an 
expansion in innovation and knowledge activities also experience an increase in 
income segregation, defined as variation of income across neighborhoods within the 
city. Their results suggest that more innovative cities are also cities with higher levels 
of earnings inequality. 
    Liu and Lawell (2015) support that there is a U-shaped relationship between 
innovation and income inequality in Chinese provinces. They state that small amounts 
of innovation can reduce income inequality but big amounts actually increase it 
following the same methodology with Lee and Pose (2013). Another paper on the 
effect of innovation on income inequality in China is by Fan et al. (2012) who find 
that innovation and inequality increased at both regional and provincial levels. In a 
recent study, De Paolo et al., (2018) show that innovation increases top income shares 
but reduces overall income inequality. 
    The above studies provide theoretical channels through which innovation may 
reduce income inequality. Innovation creates knowledge spillovers (Aghion et al., 
                                                          
5
 Commuting zones are cities and Census Tracts are neighborhoods for the USA.  
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2018), which can benefit individuals with fewer skills (Lee and Pose, 2013). These 
individuals can learn from their high skilled partners and augment their productivity 
(Lee, 2011). They then manage to increase their salaries and income inequality falls. 
However the empirical studies conducted at the regional level do not confirm the 
above arguments. One possible explanation is that geographical proximity may not be 
so important factor as other forms of proximity are (Boschma, 2005). Based on this 
framework we construct our spillover instrument in a next section.  
2.2 Innovation and Cross-Country Inequality 
    Antonelli C. and Gehringer A. (2017) argue that technological change can 
reduce income inequality. First, the creative destruction effect ruins the existing 
capital and wealth. Second, fast rates of technological change are associated with the 
creation of new firms by new entrepreneurs that are able to challenge the incumbents 
by the introduction of radical innovations. According to them, technological change 
helps increase total factor productivity and labor productivity. As a result, the wages 
of all individuals in the economy increase. They state that the strong price competition 
among companies could decrease the accumulation of rents. Economic growth 
reduces interest rates and this in turn causes a fall in capital gains. They conclude that 
in a Schumpeterian framework with fast rate of technological change the reduction of 
income inequality is possible. In line with this argument, Iacopetta (2005) states that 
fast technological change may reduce wage inequality by reducing the price of 
equipment. Then less skilled workers are more likely to use sophisticated 
technologies.  
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    Risso and Carrera (2018) find that the level of R&D should be high enough to 
reduce income inequality using the Gini index from the Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database and R&D as a percentage of GDP from the World Development 
Indicators as their measure of innovation. In any other case R&D will increase income 
inequality. Wlodarczyk (2017) employs also R&D expenditures and finds that R&D 
increases income inequalities, while EPO patent applications reduce income 
inequalities. Permana et al., (2018) adopt also EPO patent applications as a measure 
of innovation and find that innovation increases income inequality. The last two 
papers use European country samples with similar time periods
6
 and produce very 
different results. 
    Innovation may have different results in countries with dissimilar institutions. 
For example, Scandinavian countries prefer egalitarian societies (Acemoglu et al., 
2012). Also, in contrast with many European countries, the flexible US markets allow 
high skilled individuals to enter innovative sectors (Lee and Pose, 2013). 
    Chu A. and Cozzi G. (2017) create a theoretical model about patent policy and 
R&D subsidies. They examine the effects of these policies on income inequality in a 
Schumpeterian growth framework and find that these two policies produce very 
contradictory results. They conclude that strengthening patent protection causes a 
moderate increase in income inequality whereas raising R&D subsidies causes a large 
decrease in income inequality. In addition Jones and Kim (2018) develop a different 
Schumpeterian model. They claim that there are forces which boost top income shares 
by increasing the productivity of entrepreneurs but other forces enhance the creative 
                                                          
6
 The time period for Wlodarczyk (2017) is 2005-2014 and for Permana et al., (2018) is 2003-2014. 
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destruction effect. They argue that globalization may increase entrepreneurs’ profits 
but at the same time it increases competition. 
2.3 Inequality and Innovation 
     Also inequality can affect innovation. A decrease in inequality may trigger an 
increase in the number of customers who can buy new products (Hatipoglu, 2012). 
The change in inequality can affect the inventors’ expected profits and their decisions 
about R&D investments.  
    On the contrary, Tselios (2011) finds that income inequality affects positively 
innovation at the NUTS 1 level. He states that there two opposite effects: i) the market 
size effect, i.e. an unequal distribution of income is responsible for small regional 
markets for new products and those markets grow slowly, as only a small number of 
consumers can afford to buy them; ii) the price effect, which implies that inequality 
can boost innovation because the richest consumers are willing to buy new products 
(Pose and Tselios, 2010).  
    These papers underlie the potential endogeneity problem between innovation 
and income inequality, which we try to solve in a next section. In general innovation 
has an ambiguous effect on income inequality, which depends on the level of 
aggregation of the analysis. It seems that innovation increases inequality using 
regional data, but reduces it when employing country-level data.  
3    Data 
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    The data on pre-tax income shares of the top 10%, 1% and 0.5% income 
earners in our country panel analysis are drawn from the World Wealth and Income 
Database (Alvaredo et al., 2017). These data are available for some countries from 
1870 to 2016 but we focus on the period after 1978. We have chosen the Standardized 
World Income Inequality Database (Frederick Solt, 2016) for the Gini index like 
Risso and Carrera (2018). The Standardized World Income Inequality Database 
provides us with 100 equivalent Gini indexes for the pre-tax income and every of 
these has a different standard deviation. We include in our analysis the Gini index 
with the smallest standard deviation. 
    Quantity and quality measures of innovation come from The Science, 
Technology and Innovation Microdatalab of OECD. It has provided us with the 
databases containing quality and quantity measures of innovation on EPO
7
 patents. 
We use the OECD Patent Quality Indicators database, which includes the following 
quality measures of innovation: citations, claims, generality index and the family size 
of each patent and the OECD REGPAT database, which provides the location of 
inventors and applicants. Our quantity measures of innovation are the number of 
patents in the OECD Patent Quality Indicators database. When a patent has more than 
one inventor we split the patent equally among inventors (Aghion et al. 2018). We 
also use the applicants
8
 instead of inventors as a robustness check in the Appendix. 
We match the quality measures of innovation with the inventors without splitting 
them. 
                                                          
7
 We use EPO databases because out of 29 countries in our sample 12 are European countries. Still, as 
we can see in Table 2, US have the biggest share of patents in the database and Japan is third. 
8
 The name of the database is applicants but usually by applicants OECD means the firms. 
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    We consider patents granted for our benchmark analysis. This is our first 
check for the quality of patents because good applications are more likely to be 
approved than bad ones (Régibeau and Rockett, 2010). In the Appendix we show that 
our results are robust even if we use the full sample (grants plus applications). In any 
case the number of patents is a crude measure of innovation because a patent with a 
great contribution to the literature and a patent with small contribution receive the 
same weight (Aghion et al., 2018). 
    For this reason, we apply quality measures of innovation, except the number 
of patents. The measures for our benchmark analysis are: 
 Patents per capita weighted by the number of citations within  9 years: this 
variable measures the number of citations received within years   after the 
application date (Aghion et al., 2018). 
 Patents per capita weighted by the number of claims: the number of claims 
captures the breadth of a patent (Lerner, 1994 and Akcigit et al., 2016). 
 Patents per capita weighted by their generality index. The generality index is 
based on a modification of the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index and uses 
information about the number and distribution of citations received and the 
Technology classes (IPC)
10
 of the patents these citations come from  
(Squicciarini et al., 2013). 
                                                          
9
 The   can be 5 or 7 years. We use 5 years window in our main analysis but we apply also the 7 years 
window in the Appendix.  
10
 They  consider all IPC classes contained in the citing patent documents and account for the number 
and distribution of both 4-digit and n-digit IPC technology classes contained in citing patents, where n 
refers to the highest level of disaggregation possible (Squicciarini et al., 2013).  
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 Patents per capita weighted by family size. The family size is represented by 
the number of patent offices at which a given invention has been protected. 
The most valuable patents are being protected by many different patent offices 
(Squicciarini et al., 2013). 
    The time span for all our innovation measures is 1978-2015. We use the filing 
date of the application. We use the patents which have been granted and different 
quality measures of innovation. We aggregate them at the country level and then 
divide them by the population of each country. 
    Many studies focus on citation indexes. The work of Hall et al. (2001) with 
citation data provided economists with the necessary tools to study the technological 
knowledge flows between inventors, companies and regions by using the citing and 
the cited patent. However there are some major problems in the citation data. First, 
there is truncation bias due to the time lag between application and grant (Aghion et 
al. 2018).  Even though our measures of citations do not suffer much from truncation 
bias
11
 we provide Table A10 in the Appendix where we restrict our sample until 2007 
and our results are robust. Recent studies point a second problem in citation data, 
which is due to the similarity between patents. For instance Kelly et al., (2018) use the 
example of the famous patent of Nikola Tesla in 1888 with number 381,968 about AC 
motor. Despite the novelty of the patent it has received only two citations. The authors 
develop an alternative measure of innovation which captures the novel words in the 
description of the patents. In our paper we use alternative measures of innovation 
which are not based on citation data as claims and family size for our benchmark 
                                                          
11
 More details about the construction of the indexes in the Appendix.  
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analysis and include four additional measures in the Appendix. Still citation measures 
are the most famous and through them we track down the spillovers for subsequent 
innovations (Abrams et al., 2013). 
    We extract the rest of the control variables from the World Bank database. We 
have used the domestic credit (provided by financial sector as a percentage of GDP) 
to control for the financial sector influence on inequality. The financial sector usually 
helps the inventors to innovate and increase their salaries (Aghion et al., 2018). For 
instance, a big share of the employees (almost 27%) who belong in the top 0.1% 
income share in the United States  work in the financial sector or use financial 
services (Szymborska, 2016). The second variable is general government final 
consumption expenditure (% of GDP) in order to control for the effect of government 
size in each country. Empirical studies find that government size has a negative effect 
on capital income inequality and specifically on the top 1% income share (Luo et al., 
2017). Next we include in our analysis GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$), because 
it has been found that GDP per capita has a positive effect on Gini index and the 
highest quintile income shares (Barro, 2008). We also control for the business cycle 
by using the unemployment rate (Aghion et al., 2018) and include population growth. 
We end up with an unbalanced panel of 29 countries over the time period 1978-2015.  
4 Empirical Strategy 
4.1 Estimation Methodology 
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    Our estimation method is similar with that of Aghion et al., (2018). We take 
the log of our innovation measures, inequality and GDP per capita and estimate the 
following equation: 
                                              
where   stands for country i,    stands for time period t,     is the measure of inequality 
(in log),   is the constant,   ,    correspond to country and year fixed 
effects,             is innovation in year     (also in log) and,    are the control 
variables. We use country and year fixed effects to account for permanent cross-
country differences in inequality and overall changes in inequality respectively. The 
advantage by taking both measures of inequality and innovation in logs is that    can 
be interpreted as the elasticity of inequality with respect to innovation. We estimate 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in all regressions. 
    We have decided to take the one year lag of innovation as the main 
independent variable. Our database, Patent Quality Indicators, provides us with the 
application dates of the patents. We include in our analysis patents from the European 
Patent Office. Depalo and Addario (2014) use the EPO patents Database and find that 
inventors’ earnings peak at     instead of  . They assume that bureaucracy is 
responsible for this delay. A second empirical study of Bell (2016), who uses patents 
from USPTO, confirms the conclusion that inventors’ income increases before the 
application date. In the recent study of De Palo et al., (2018), the authors apply one 
year lag in their innovation measure and their sample is for European regions. So, we 
choose the one year lag for our measures of innovation.  
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4.2 Endogeneity and Spillover Instrument 
    As it has been pointed in subsection 2.3 inequality can also boost innovation. 
Here, we argue that there is a casual effect from innovation on income inequality. Our 
first instrument accounts for the spillover effects of innovation. We claim that past 
innovation predicts and facilitates recent innovation. Knowledge creation boosts 
inequality, while knowledge diffusion through linkages and networks creates new 
opportunities (Iammarino et al., 2018). We build our citation network based on the 
location of the inventors. We want to capture the existence of spillovers among 
inventors (Aghion and Jaravel, 2015). 
    We follow the methodology of Aghion et al., (2018) to construct our spillover 
instrument. We use the OECD Citations database. The intuition is to instrument 
innovation in a country by its predicted value, based on past innovation intensities in 
other countries and the propensity to cite patents from these other countries (Aghion 
et al., 2018), (Technical details on the construction of the instrument are provided in 
the Appendix). A second study of Berkes and Gaetani (2018) use a similar approach 
with the paper of Aghion et al., (2018). They split their sample of patents in 1994 and 
they use the old sample (from 1985-1994) to predict innovation activity in more 
recent years (2005-2014).  
    The first point, which both studies focus on, is the geographical externalities 
of the instrument and the potential instrument’s impact on local outcomes. Both 
studies are conducted at the regional level while our study is conducted at the country 
level. There are much longer distances among countries than in regions within 
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countries, so we do not worry much about this problem. However someone may claim 
the exactly opposite that long distances among countries makes difficult the diffusion 
of knowledge. According to many studies geographical proximity is not the reason for 
knowledge spillovers or innovation diffusion. The necessary conditions for 
knowledge to travel are the existence of strong organizational channels (such as firms) 
and, dense knowledge community networks and skills and this is exactly what we aim 
to capture by our spillover instrument (Breschi and Lissoni, 2001; Boschma, 2005; 
D’Este et al., 2013). 
    The second point is the predicting power of the instrument for recent 
innovation activity. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) introduce the notion of absorptive 
capacity and claim that knowledge spillovers can induce complementarities in R&D 
efforts (Aghion and Jaravel, 2015). According to Aghion and Jaravel (2015) 
innovation in one country is often built on knowledge created by innovations in 
another country. Malerba et al., (2013) use patent data from EPO and find that 
international R&D spillovers are effective in fostering patenting. Citations reveal past 
knowledge spillovers and provide channels for future innovation (Caballero and Jaffe, 
1993). Also, spillovers reduce the cost of innovation (Aghion et al., 2018). Our first 
stage results from Table A5 in the Appendix confirm the strength of our instrument. 
The coefficient of our spillover instrument is positive and significant when we use 
either quantity or quality measures of innovation.  
    A final point is the similarity between citation measures and our spillover 
instrument. The spillover network can be very different at different lags between 
citing and cited patent (Acemoglu et al., 2016). Also we apply additional robustness 
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checks in Table A7 of the Appendix. Our instrument is based on the links between 
citing and cited patents until 1985. We exclude from the sample first all years before 
1985 and then all years before 1987 to eliminate any doubts. Our measures of 
innovation remain significant. We take the one year lag of our instrument like 
(Aghion et al., 2018) to avoid any concerns about demand shocks. 
4.3 Robustness Checks 
    In this section, we apply a second instrument as a robustness check. Our 
second instrument is the log of “charges for the use of intellectual property, receipts 
(BoP, current US$)” from International Monetary Fund. Our argument is that 
countries which possess patents of high quality are going to receive bigger amounts of 
money for the authorized use of proprietary rights such as patents, trademarks, 
copyrights, industrial processes and designs including trade secrets and franchises. 
This is the first reason why we are interested on the receipts and not payments. 
Intellectual property rights have a positive effect on measures of innovation. Strong 
protection stimulates innovative activity and increases innovation incentives (Kanwar 
and Evenson, 2003 and Beladi et al., 2016). Kanwar and Evenson (2003) find that 
intellectual property protection has a positive effect on R&D expenditures, while 
Beladi et al., (2016) claim that strategic IPRs enforcement can be used as an effective 
instrument to subsidize contractual R&D. Dutta and Sharma (2008) test the effect of 
intellectual property rights on Indian firms and find that not only IPR increases R&D 
expenditures but also facilitates patenting by India in the U.S. Chu et al., (2017) 
explores the effect of IPR on China and conclude that IPR has a positive effect on 
innovation. Branstetter et al. (2005) use U.S. multinational firms’ data and find 
18 
 
limited evidence that IPR boosts domestic innovation. Also Chu and Cozzi (2017) 
state that patent protection and R&D subsidies are two important policy instruments 
that determine technological progress and economic growth. Aghion et al., (2015) 
find that the product market reform, which took place in EU in 1992, facilitated 
innovative investments in manufacturing industries of countries with strong patent 
rights. They found a complementarity between competition and patent protection by 
using a theoretical and an empirical model. This policy helped the industries with 
strong patent rights to increase their R&D investments. The literature confirms the 
positive relationship between IPR and innovation.  
    Next we examine if this instrument is exogenous to income inequality. Here is 
the second reason why we use receipts. The “charges for the use of intellectual 
property, receipts” come from non-residents. At the country level this means that this 
amount of money enters the domestic market from a foreign country. So, we believe 
that this instrument correlates directly only with our measures of innovation and it is 
unlikely to affect other domestic variables. To avoid any suspicions that our variable 
could potential affect indirectly our measures of inequality we use the lead of the 
variable as instrument. By using the     periods for our instrument we believe that 
the case for it being exogenous with regard to income inequality in period   is even 
stronger.      There is a second reason for using the     value of our instrument. The 
average time for a patent to be granted in the EPO was almost 4 years in the 2005 
(45.3 months, source: EPO official website). So, we apply the     year to the 
application date in our model and use     years of our instrument. 
5 Results 
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5.1 Summary Statistics and OLS Results 
    In this section we present the results from both OLS and IV regressions. All 
variables are defined in Table 1. We provide the sample of countries in Table 2 sorted 
both by the number of patents and top income share. Then, we present summary 
statistics in Table 3. In Table 4 we provide descriptive statistics for the measures of 
innovation and inequality for two distinctive years. It is clear that there is a significant 
increase in the means of our measures of inequality from 1985 to 2005. Also the 
minimum and maximum values have increased over these years. We reach the same 
conclusion also from the table with the innovation measures. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
    Next, we provide the results from OLS regressions. Table 5 regresses the top 
1% income share on our measures of innovation with a 1-year lag. We see that all our 
measures of innovation have a significant and negative effect on top 1% income share 
as we expect from theory. We have taken the logs for both measures of innovation 
and top 1% income share so that we can interpret the coefficient of innovation as 
elasticity. A 1% increase in the number of citations is associated with a 0.0225% 
decrease of the top 1% income share. The rest of the variables in column 2 have the 
expected signs. In Table A2 of the Appendix we use clustered standard errors at the 
country level to allow for correlation within countries. The citations within a 5-year 
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window keep the negative effect but at the 5% level of significance. We also provide 
in Tables A3-A4 of the Appendix alternative measures of innovation as robustness 
checks with robust and clustered standard errors respectively. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
    In Table 6, we test the effect of innovation on different measures of inequality. 
It is clear from this Table that innovation influences top income shares. We provide 
the most widely used measures of overall inequality and Gini index. Innovation has a 
negative coefficient, so innovation reduces not only top income but also overall 
income inequality. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
5.2 IV Results 
    In Table 7 we present evidence after we use the spillover instrument. We see 
that now all measures of innovation are significant and have a negative effect on the 
top 1% income share. For instance a 1% increase in the citations within a 5 year 
window is associated with a 0.0402% fall of the top income share. In Table A8 of the 
Appendix we apply alternative measures of innovation with the spillover instrument 
and the effect is again negative and significant.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
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    Next, in Table 8 we present our results when we use as instrument the charges 
of intellectual property rights. A 1% increase in the citations within a 5 year window 
reduces the top 1% income share by 0.0813%. Again in Table A9 we provide 
different measures of innovation with our second instrument and the results confirm 
the negative and significant effect of innovation.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
    In Table 9 we use both our instruments. Again we show that innovation 
measures have a negative impact on top income inequality. Our test statistics confirm 
that our instruments are appropriate. 
    Table 10 regresses the various measures of inequality on our measure of 
innovation (citation on a 5-year window). Innovation influences negatively the top 
10% and top 0.5% income shares. Also, we see in column 5 that citations have a 
negative and significant effect on the Gini index. In Table A11 of the Appendix we 
use claims as measures of innovation and the spillover instrument. We get similar 
results as in Table 10.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
5.3 Additional Findings and Discussion 
    Like Aghion et al. (2018) the magnitude of the coefficient of citations (column 
2) in Table 7 is much bigger than the corresponding coefficient in column 2 in Table 
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5. Aghion et al. (2018) state that a good reason could be the interaction between 
innovation and competition. This explanation is based on the inverted-U relationship 
between these two variables (Aghion et al., 2005). 
    The government size and unemployment rate are also significant and with the 
expected signs. Both variables are in percentages (between 0-1) and indicate that a 1% 
increase in the government size, decreases the top 1% income share by 2.383% (Table 
7),  while the same increase in unemployment rate increases the top 1% income share 
by 0.959% (column 2). In contrast with Aghion et al. (2018) we find strong evidence 
that government size and unemployment rate have the strongest effects, while the 
financial sector has a weaker effect. This is not surprising if we consider that in our 
sample 12 out of 29 countries are European. Even though Nickell (1997) states that 
there are big differences among European countries, we cannot ignore the fact that 
unemployment rate is very high in Europe (Fanti and Gori, 2011) and many European 
countries (high GDP countries) have higher than the optimal level of government size 
compatible with GDP growth rate maximization (Forte and Magazzino, 2011).  
    In the Second Appendix we present additional IV results when we use the full 
sample of patents
12
 and also when we match patents with applicants. More details 
about the construction of these databases can be found in the Appendix. We apply 
both our instruments in these regressions. We use the full sample in Table S2 and the 
applicants in Table S4 of the Second Appendix. Again the effect of innovation on 
income inequality is negative and significant. 
                                                          
12
 When we say full sample we mean also applications that have been not granted.  
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6 Conclusions 
    To the best of our knowledge, we make the first attempt to explore the effect 
of innovation on top income shares at the country level and provide robust evidence 
accounting for endogeneity. In addition, our results are robust with respect to 
alternative inequality measures, quality indexes of innovation, truncation bias, the use 
of patent applications together with the granted patents and different ways to split or 
allocate the patents. 
    We identify a network of inventors through citations and our spillover 
instrument predicts recent innovation activity. We show that knowledge can be 
transferred between countries. The mobility of the inventors is a very crucial topic 
because they contribute to the diffusion of knowledge between different places 
(Miguelez., 2013 and Miguelez., 2018) . 
    Our analysis concludes that innovation reduces personal income disparities 
within countries. We find strong evidence that innovation reduces top income 
inequality using various top income shares. When we test the effect of innovation on 
overall inequality, we also find strong evidence that innovation reduces it. Our analysis 
is also based on various quantity and quality measures of innovation. Quality measures 
of innovation take into consideration the magnitude of the novel inventions in contrast 
with the quantity measures. We have showed also that innovation affects inequality 
and not the opposite by applying IV analysis. We could not explore the relationship 
between innovation and top income shares for a longer time period due to the limited 
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data on income shares
13
 at the country level. Finally, an extension of the analysis could 
include property rights Tebaldi and Elmslie (2013) or taxation Akcigit et al. (2016) as 
additional control variables.  
                                                          
13
 Higher top income shares than 1% like 0.5% or 0.01%. 
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FIGURE 1 
 
Notes: Measures of Innovation per capita and Inequality in two distinctive years. We divided the measures of inequality by 10000. 
Number of citations received within 5 years of the application date. Source: OECD Patent Quality Database and WID.   
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FIGURE 2 
 
Notes: This figure illustrates the difference of the log of the number of citations per capita against the difference of the log of the 
top 1% income share in 1995 and 2010. The countries with the red labels exhibit an increase in the number of citations and a 
decrease in the top 1% income share. Number of citations received within 5 years of the application date. Source: OECD Patent 
Quality Database and WID.  
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TABLE 1 
Variable description and notation 
Variable names Description 
 Measures of Inequality 
Top i% Share of income own by the top i% (i being equal to 10, 1 and 0.5) of the 
income distribution. Time: 1960-2016. Source: WID. 
Gini  Gini index of inequality with the smallest standard deviation. Time: 1960-2016.  
Source: SWIID.  
 Measures of innovation 
Patent Total number of patent granted by the EPO per capita. Time: 1978-2015. 
Source: OECD.  
Cit(i) Total number of citations received no longer than i=5 or i=7 years after 
applications per capita. Time: 1978-2015. Source: OECD. 
Claims Total number of claims per capita. Time: 1978-2015. Source: OECD. 
Generality Index Total number of patents weighted by the Generality index per capita. Time 
1978-2015. Source: OECD.  
Family The number of patent offices at which a given invention has been protected per 
capita. Time: 1978-2015. Source: OECD. 
Grant lag The time elapsed between the filing date of the application and the date of the 
grant per capita. Time: 1978-2015. Source: OECD. 
Renewal The count of years during a patent has been renewed per capita. Time: 1978-
2015. Source: OECD. 
Patent Scope The scope of a patent in terms of the number of distinct 4-digit subclasses of the 
International Patent Classification per capita. Time: 1978-2015. Source: OECD. 
Many fields Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the patent is allocated to other fields 
per capita. Time: 1978-2015. Source: OECD. 
 Control Variables 
Popgr Growth of total population. Time: 1960-2015. Source: World Bank. 
Gvtsize General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP). Time: 1960-
2015. Source: World Bank.  
Unemployment Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (national estimate). Time: 1960-
2015. Source: World Bank. 
Gdppc Real GDP per capita in US $ (in log). Time: 1960-2015. Source: World Bank.  
Finance Domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP). Time: 1960-2015. 
Source: World Bank.  
 Instruments 
Charges Charges for the use of intellectual property, receipts (BoP, current US$). Time: 
1960-2015. Source: International Monetary Fund. 
Spillover Links between citing and cited patent. Time: 1978-1985. Source: OECD 
Citations database, March 2018. 
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TABLE 2 
Countries sorted by top income share and number of patents granted 
Country Code Top 1% Income Share Country Code Patents 
BR 0.2769 US 9131.182 
LB 0.2303 DE 8997.221 
TR 0.2043 JP 7318.001 
CO 0.1957 FR 3330.792 
RU 0.1695 GB 1984.298 
US 0.1586 IT 1528.121 
AR 0.1436 CH 1179.77 
IN 0.1401 NL 1053.845 
ZA 0.1383 SE 866.688 
SG 0.1208 KR 612.8299 
DE 0.1180 CA 479.5446 
CA 0.1157 DK 323.7587 
GB 0.1096 CN 311.5027 
CN 0.1052 ES 261.8465 
FR 0.0979 AU 213.376 
JP 0.0955 IN 88.22777 
CH 0.0946 RU 74.56846 
ES 0.0907 IE 61.33867 
KR 0.0890 TR 47.05082 
MY 0.0887 ZA 44.95966 
IE 0.0839 BR 40.76601 
IT 0.0808 SG 38.51117 
NZ 0.0769 NZ 32.57962 
PT 0.0766 PT 16.06893 
SE 0.0688 AR 10.3987 
AU 0.0684 MY 9.806165 
NL 0.0603 CO 2.062382 
DK 0.0543 LB 1.516281 
MU 0.0540 MU 0.78125 
Notes: The left column illustrates the countries sorted by the mean of top 1 percent income share over 
the period 1978-2015 while the right column represents the countries sorted by the mean number of 
patents granted over the period 1978-2015. Codes and Names: AR (Argentina), AU (Australia), BR 
(Brazil), CA (Canada), CH (Switzerland), CN (China), CO (Colombia), DE (Germany), DK 
(Denmark), ES (Spain), FR (France), GB (United Kingdom), IE (Ireland), IN (India), IT (Italy), JP 
(Japan), KR (South Korea), LB (Lebanon), MU (Mauritius), MY (Malaysia), NL (Netherlands), NZ 
(New Zealand), PT (Portugal), RU (Russian Federation),  SE (Sweden), SG (Singapore), TR (Turkey), 
US (United States), ZA (South Africa). 
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TABLE 3 
Summary statistics of the main variables 
Basic Variables Observations Mean Standard Deviation 
    Innovation 
   Patents 1,020 1414.559 2957.226 
Cits5 1,020 4610.21 11841.81 
Claims 1,020 43768.22 103913.3 
Generality Index 1,020 637.4894 1553.293 
Family_size 1,020 24936.44 57135.35 
    Inequality 
   Top 10% 736 0.3431062 0.0810591 
Top 1% 806 0.1082087 0.0517032 
Top 0.5% 797 0.078386 0.0431325 
Gini index 1040 0.4668933 0.0627005 
    Control Variables 
   Gdppc 1079 24664.8 18003.09 
Government 1071 16.75752 4.588026 
Finance 1042 106.3674 62.0598 
Unemployment 958 7.40703 4.537359 
Popgrowth 1101 1.004564 0.8874716 
    Instruments 
   Spillover per capita 982 2.55E-06 5.38E-06 
Charges (in log,3 years lead) 773 19.67748 0.8874716 
    Additional Innovation Variables 
   Cits7 1,020 5974.502 15417.47 
Grant_lag 1,020 6894717 1.69E+07 
Rrenewal 1,020 39311.05 94200.98 
Patent_scope 1,020 7440.13 17219.43 
Many_field 1,020 1658.817 3885.518 
Notes: Summary statistics for the main variables calculated over the period 1978-2015. GDP per capita is calculated in $ per 
capita. The additional innovation variables appear only in the Appendix. 
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TABLE 4 
Descriptive statistics of measures of Innovation and Inequality 
 Mean P25 P50 P75 Min  Max 
1985       
Patents 1024.213 4.9999 47.1671 818.4558 2.25 6474.606 
Citations 3148.68 10 65 1796 2 23886 
Claims 21908.16 87 717 11689 30 153255 
Generality Index 477.6779 2.635417 13.7908 272.5453 1.48 3542.336 
Family_size 14736.48 133 715 9840 36 99721 
Top 10% 0.299593 0.2719911 0.2990886 0.3362401 0.2237018 0.36657 
Top 1% 0.0757316 0.0550965 0.075687 0.09051 0.0438392 0.12553 
Top 0.5% 0.0511046 0.0347679 0.0528679 0.0618155 0.0269458 0.09316 
Gini Index 0.4533452 0.4135882 0.4355646 0.4796089 0.3504605 0.6278827 
       
2005       
Patents 2175.706 75.2403 471.2052 1915.728 4.5667 13827.53 
Citations 8087.41 145 1115 7820 15 76995 
Claims 82155.78 3092 16792 80443 47 691068 
Generality Index 965.4901 11.05057 177.5321 778.7822 3.363457 7880.999 
Family_size 41917.85 1648 8052 39926 42 352949 
Top 10% 0.3683359 0.3165537 0.3777983 0.4185774 0.1396149 0.550825 
Top 1% 0.1341594 0.0940248 0.1153626 0.1838664 0.049756 0.2780328 
Top 0.5% 0.0983904 0.0642 0.0848751 0.1247931 0.0359116 0.2242774 
Gini Index 0.4722523 0.4442616 0.4761565 0.4951895 0.3352951 0.6380104 
Notes: Summary statistics includes mean, percentile thresholds, minimum and maximum for our  measures in two distinctive 
years. 
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TABLE 5 
Innovation and Top 1% Income Share-OLS Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% 
Measures of Innovation Patents Cit5 Claims Generality Family 
Innovation -0.0503*** -0.0225*** -0.0248*** -0.0229*** -0.0227*** 
 (-3.45) (-3.43) (-3.75) (-3.19) (-3.10) 
      
Popgr 0.0166 0.0167 0.0171 0.0161 0.0163 
 (1.44) (1.46) (1.47) (1.38) (1.40) 
      
Gvtsize -2.520*** -2.567*** -2.524*** -2.581*** -2.558*** 
 (-5.66) (-5.87) (-5.76) (-5.88) (-5.80) 
      
Unemployment 0.826*** 0.809*** 0.822*** 0.794*** 0.795*** 
 (3.18) (3.11) (3.15) (3.06) (3.02) 
      
Gdppc 0.265*** 0.255*** 0.269*** 0.243*** 0.252*** 
 (5.66) (5.81) (6.08) (5.59) (5.31) 
      
Finance 0.0473** 0.0505** 0.0487** 0.0533** 0.0480** 
 (2.05) (2.21) (2.13) (2.30) (2.07) 
      
Observations 665 665 665 665 665 
R
2
 0.940 0.940 0.941 0.940 0.940 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs and lagged by one year. The dependent variable is the log of the top 1% income share. Panel data OLS 
regressions with country and year fixed effects. Time span: 1979-2015. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance. 
 
TABLE 6 
Citation and Different Measures of Inequality-OLS results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables Top10% Top1% Top0.5% Gini 
Cit5 -0.0109*** -0.0225*** -0.0257*** -0.00937*** 
 (-2.95) (-3.43) (-2.92) (-6.55) 
     
Popgr -0.00500 0.0167 0.000370 0.00782** 
 (-0.74) (1.46) (0.03) (2.18) 
     
Gvtsize -0.184 -2.567*** -2.515*** -0.591*** 
 (-0.74) (-5.87) (-4.70) (-5.78) 
     
Unemployment 0.917*** 0.809*** 0.667** 0.674*** 
 (6.32) (3.11) (2.03) (8.32) 
     
Gdppc 0.183*** 0.255*** 0.266*** 0.0686*** 
 (7.46) (5.81) (4.48) (4.75) 
     
Finance 0.0184 0.0505** -0.0242 0.0548*** 
 (1.26) (2.21) (-0.86) (9.39) 
     
Observations 633 665 564 856 
R
2
 0.933 0.940 0.946 0.897 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs and lagged by one year. The dependent variables are the log of different measures of 
inequality. Panel data OLS regressions with country and year fixed effects. Time span: 1979-2015. Autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 
levels of significance. 
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TABLE 7 
Innovation and Top 1% Income Share using Spillover Instrument-IV results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% 
Measures of Innovation Patents Cit5 Claims Generality Family 
Innovation -0.0923*** -0.0402*** -0.0403*** -0.0432*** -0.0440*** 
 (-3.32) (-3.30) (-3.36) (-3.30) (-3.33) 
Popgr 0.0105 0.0103 0.0110 0.00940 0.00977 
 (0.93) (0.95) (0.96) (0.84) (0.86) 
Gvtsize -2.251*** -2.383*** -2.379*** -2.354*** -2.314*** 
 (-4.73) (-5.21) (-5.23) (-5.11) (-4.94) 
      
Unemployment 1.008*** 0.959*** 0.949*** 0.954*** 0.963*** 
 (3.60) (3.49) (3.45) (3.46) (3.42) 
      
Gdppc 0.399*** 0.372*** 0.370*** 0.366*** 0.388*** 
 (4.55) (4.62) (4.71) (4.67) (4.59) 
      
Finance 0.0280 0.0345* 0.0319 0.0386* 0.0287 
 (1.35) (1.70) (1.56) (1.85) (1.39) 
Observations 641 641 641 641 641 
R
2
 0.698 0.698 0.700 0.696 0.695 
F-first stage 45.79 49.66 51.53 56.74 48.63 
Groups 27 27 27 27 27 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs and lagged by one year. The dependent variable is the log of the top 1% income share. Panel data 2SLS 
regressions with country and year fixed effects. Time span: 1979-2014. The lag between the spillover instrument and the endogenous variables is 
set to 1 year. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 
0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance. 
TABLE 8 
Innovation and Top 1% Income Share using Charges as an Instrument-IV results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% 
Measures of Innovation Patents Cit5 Claims Generality Family 
Innovation -0.247** -0.0813*** -0.0723*** -0.0951*** -0.0825*** 
 (-2.28) (-2.80) (-2.82) (-2.63) (-2.67) 
Popgr -0.0198 -0.0144 -0.0166 -0.0186 -0.0198 
 (-1.60) (-1.29) (-1.46) (-1.50) (-1.64) 
Gvtsize -1.712** -2.108*** -2.192*** -2.121*** -2.117*** 
 (-2.22) (-3.61) (-4.19) (-3.66) (-3.66) 
      
Unemployment 2.207** 1.635*** 1.537*** 1.825*** 1.543*** 
 (2.49) (2.87) (2.92) (2.84) (2.71) 
      
Gdppc 1.056** 0.764*** 0.680*** 0.799*** 0.735*** 
 (2.53) (3.22) (3.29) (3.02) (3.10) 
      
Finance 0.0248 0.0487* 0.0279 0.0461 0.0261 
 (0.79) (1.65) (1.04) (1.50) (0.94) 
Observations 512 512 512 512 512 
R
2
 0.569 0.666 0.700 0.655 0.663 
F-first stage 8.90 18.21 24.07 17.66 17.41 
Groups 28 28 28 28 28 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs and lagged by one year. The dependent variable is the log of the top 1% income share. Panel data 2SLS regressions 
with country and year fixed effects. Time span: 1979-2014. The lead between the instrument based on charges and the endogenous variables is set to 
3 years. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.1 levels of significance. 
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TABLE 9 
Innovation and Top 1% Income Share using two instruments-IV results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% 
Measures of Innovation Patents Cit5 Claims Generality Family 
Innovation -0.106*** -0.0433*** -0.0409*** -0.0445*** -0.0440*** 
 (-2.81) (-2.85) (-2.93) (-2.81) (-2.88) 
Popgr -0.0142 -0.0124 -0.0138 -0.0135 -0.0155 
 (-1.38) (-1.20) (-1.32) (-1.26) (-1.47) 
      
Gvtsize -2.122*** -2.227*** -2.263*** -2.256*** -2.194*** 
 (-4.26) (-4.61) (-4.89) (-4.79) (-4.53) 
      
Unemployment 1.434*** 1.276*** 1.272*** 1.317*** 1.253*** 
 (3.31) (3.24) (3.25) (3.33) (3.15) 
      
Gdppc 0.533*** 0.477*** 0.446*** 0.453*** 0.464*** 
 (3.53) (3.67) (3.85) (3.75) (3.71) 
      
Finance -0.00113 0.0142 0.00359 0.00899 0.00174 
 (-0.04) (0.52) (0.14) (0.33) (0.07) 
Observations 495 495 495 495 495 
R
2
 0.734 0.741 0.747 0.744 0.739 
F-first stage 24.89 27.99 35.32 38.66 28.73 
Sargan-Hansen (p-value) 0.4807 0.5393 0.6261 0.4263 0.6215 
Groups 26 26 26 26 26 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs and lagged by one year. The dependent variable is the log of the top 1% income share. Panel data 2SLS regressions 
with country and year fixed effects. Time span: 1979-2012. The lag between the spillover instrument and the endogenous variables is set to 1 and the 
lead between the charges instrument and the endogenous variables is set to 3 years. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are 
presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance. 
 
TABLE 10 
Citation and Different Measures of Inequality using Spillover Instrument-IV results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables Top10% Top1% Top0.5% Gini 
Cit5 -0.0122* -0.0402*** -0.0271* -0.0145*** 
 (-1.71) (-3.30) (-1.70) (-4.10) 
Popgr -0.00923 0.0103 -0.00449 0.00530 
 (-1.48) (0.95) (-0.35) (1.46) 
Gvtsize -0.309 -2.383*** -2.491*** -0.478*** 
 (-1.34) (-5.21) (-4.54) (-4.38) 
Unemployment 0.878*** 0.959*** 0.605* 0.681*** 
 (6.18) (3.49) (1.85) (7.41) 
Gdppc 0.190*** 0.372*** 0.287*** 0.100*** 
 (4.07) (4.62) (2.63) (4.33) 
     
Finance 0.00916 0.0345* -0.0283 0.0505*** 
 (0.74) (1.70) (-1.02) (8.65) 
Observations 619 641 552 825 
R
2
 0.643 0.698 0.702 0.450 
F-first stage 46.54 49.66 39.51 91.84 
Groups 25 27 25 28 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs and lagged by one year. The dependent variables are the log of different 
measures of inequality. Panel data 2SLS regressions with country and year fixed effects. Time span: 1979-2014 for 
columns 1, 2, 3 and 1979-2015 for column 4. The lag between the spillover instrument and the endogenous 
variables is set to 1 year. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance. 
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Appendix 
A. Construction of the Main Database 
    We use patents and inventors from EPO to construct our databases. First we 
extract the Quality indicators from the Quality Database of OECD (Squicciarini et al., 
2013). This database contains 3,190,373 patents. The 1,529,776 out of 3,190,373 were 
granted. For our benchmark analysis we include in the sample only the granted 
patents. This dataset contains quality indexes of innovation like citations within 5- and 
7- year windows, claims, generality index, family size, grant lag, renewal, patent 
scope and many fields. In our basic analysis we apply the citations in a 5- year 
window, claims, generality index and family size as Aghion et al. (2018). We test the 
effect of 5 additional measures of innovation (citation in a 7- year window, grant lag, 
renewal, patent scope and many fields) on top 1% income share to robustify our 
results. Our quality measures of innovation do not suffer from truncation bias because 
they have normalized according to the maximum value received by patents in the 
same year-and-technology cohort (Squicciarini et al., 2013). In any case we restrict 
our sample of patents until 2015.  
    Our additional quality measures of innovation contain information about the 
issue speed, the value and the complexity of the patent. Specifically: 
 Patents per capita weighted by the grant lag index: The logic of this index is 
that the most important patents are granted faster than the less important ones 
(Régibeau and Rockett, 2010).  
 Patents per capita weighted by the renewal index: This index shows that the 
most valuable patents are renewed for longer periods (Pakes, 1986).  
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 Patents per capita weighted by the patent scope index: The scope of patents is 
associated with the technological breadth and economic value of patents (Lerner, 
1994). 
 Patents per capita weighted by the many fields index: This index shows if the 
patent is allocated to more than one field. 
More details about the construction of the indexes can be found in “Measuring Patent 
Quality: Indicator of Technological and Economic Value”, Squicciarini et al., 2013. 
    We match the patents with their inventors from the REGPAT database
14
. We 
manage to allocate 1,526,891 out of 1,529,776 (99% matching) to their inventors. 
REGPAT contains a variable, reg_share, which shows how much precise is the 
location of the inventor. We include only inventors with reg_share more than 70%. 
Our final database has 3,861,884 observations over the time period 1978-2015. After 
we exclude also the countries that do not have data about inequality we end up with 
3,665,830 observations. We provide the share of patents for every country in the 
Table A1. We call this database: Database 1.  
B.  Construction of Additional Databases 
    In order to check the robustness of our results we construct two additional 
databases. First, we follow the same methodology as in the previous section but this 
time we have included all patents and not just patents granted. According to Abrams 
et al., (2013) many companies create patent applications (defensive patents) to erect 
barriers for the new entrants, especially in fields of rapid development. If our quality 
                                                          
14
 Every time we want to match a patent database of OECD with REGPAT we use the appln_id which 
is the Patent application identifier (PATSTAT, October 2012). 
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measures of patents are good proxies for radical innovation then they should take into 
consideration this fact because defensive patents should have received fewer citations. 
    We now use the full sample of observations from the Quality Database of 
OECD. Again we allocate the patents to their inventors from the REGPAT database. 
We manage to match 3,175,990 patents out of 3,190,373 (99% matching). Again we 
apply the same restrictions as in the previous section and end up with 7,686,937 
observations over the time period 1978-2015. The share of applications for every 
country exists in Table S1. We call this database: Database 2. 
    In our final database we change the matching method. We keep just the 
patents that have been granted but instead of inventors we allocate the patents to their 
applicants
15
. The rest of the methodology remains the same. We match 1,529,724 
patents out of 1,529,776. After we apply the same restrictions to the database we end 
up with 1,544,772 observations over the time period 1978-2015. The share for every 
country appears in Table S3. We call this database: Database 3. 
C. Construction of the Spillover Instrument 
    We follow the same methodology with Aghion et al., (2018) to build our 
spillover instrument. First we construct the relative weight of country j in the citations 
with lag k of patents granted in country i, aggregated over the period 1978-1985
16
.  
       
                     
                
    
      
  
                                                          
15
 As we notice by applicants the OECD refers to companies. 
16
 The OECD Citations database contains cited patents from 1836.  
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This is a matrix of weights, where for each pair of countries (i,j), and for each lag k 
between citing and cited patents (we restrict the k to be between three and ten years), 
wi,j,k denotes the relative weight. 
    Next we create our instrument as follows:  
      
 
       
                     
 
   
  
   
 
where Pop−i,t is the population of countries but not the country i, m(i,j,t,k) represents 
the number of citations from a patent in country i, with an application date t to a 
patent of country j filed k years before t, and innov(j,t−k) is our measure of innovation 
in country j at time t−k and the log of KS is the instrument. To reduce the risk of 
simultaneity, we set a one-year time lag between the endogenous variable and this 
instrument. We normalize by Pop−i,t , as otherwise our measure of spillovers would 
mechanically put at a relative disadvantage a country the population of which grows 
faster than the others. 
    We use the OECD Citations database for this instrument and specifically the 
EP_CITATIONS dataset. This dataset contains 11,795,845 links between citing and 
cited patents from EPO. We use the REGPAT database to match the patents with their 
inventors. After the merge our database has 45,692,954 observations.  
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 TABLE A1 
Share of patents for every country in Database 1 
Code Share  Code Share 
AR 0.02%  JP 22.43% 
AU 0.49%  KR 1.99% 
BR 0.11%  LB 0.00% 
CA 1.28%  MU 0.00% 
CH 2.52%  MY 0.03% 
CN 0.9%  NL 2.39% 
CO 0.00%  NZ 0.08% 
DE 22.78%  PT 0.04% 
DK 0.72%  RU 0.2% 
ES 0.68%  SE 1.84% 
FR 7.54%  SG 0.1% 
GB 4.46%  TR 0.11% 
IE 0.16%  US 25.5% 
IN 0.34%  ZA 0.09% 
IT 3.21%  
  
Notes: CO has 158 patents, LB has 58 patents and MU has 9 patents. Time Period: 1978-2015 
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TABLE A2 
Innovation and Top 1% Income Share with clustered standard errors-OLS Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% 
Measures of Innovation Patents Cit5 Claims Generality Family 
Innovation -0.0503** -0.0225** -0.0248** -0.0229* -0.0227* 
 (-2.19) (-2.10) (-2.39) (-1.98) (-1.99) 
      
Popgr 0.0166 0.0167 0.0171 0.0161 0.0163 
 (0.70) (0.72) (0.74) (0.68) (0.71) 
      
Gvtsize -2.520** -2.567*** -2.524** -2.581*** -2.558*** 
 (-2.75) (-2.77) (-2.70) (-2.82) (-2.82) 
      
Unemployment 0.826 0.809 0.822 0.794 0.795 
 (1.24) (1.22) (1.23) (1.19) (1.19) 
      
Gdppc 0.265*** 0.255*** 0.269*** 0.243*** 0.252*** 
 (3.77) (3.70) (3.97) (3.45) (3.54) 
      
Finance 0.0473 0.0505 0.0487 0.0533 0.0480 
 (0.89) (0.97) (0.94) (1.01) (0.90) 
      
Observations 665 665 665 665 665 
R
2
 0.940 0.940 0.941 0.940 0.940 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs and lagged by one year. The dependent variable is the log of the top 1% income share. Panel data 
OLS regressions with country and year fixed effects. Time span: 1979-2015. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity clustered standard 
errors are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance. 
 
TABLE A3 
Alternative measures of Innovation and Top 1% Income Share-OLS results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% 
Measures of Innovation Cit7 Grant Lag Renewal Patents Scope Many Fields 
Innovation -0.0237*** -0.0256*** -0.0266*** -0.0267*** -0.0273*** 
 (-3.56) (-3.64) (-3.82) (-3.86) (-3.83) 
      
Popgr 0.0168 0.0166 0.0165 0.0170 0.0164 
 (1.48) (1.44) (1.44) (1.48) (1.44) 
      
Gvtsize -2.558*** -2.550*** -2.541*** -2.534*** -2.547*** 
 (-5.86) (-5.81) (-5.78) (-5.78) (-5.85) 
      
Unemployment 0.824*** 0.848*** 0.855*** 0.860*** 0.848*** 
 (3.15) (3.24) (3.26) (3.30) (3.25) 
      
Gdppc 0.263*** 0.275*** 0.281*** 0.281*** 0.278*** 
 (5.90) (5.81) (6.00) (6.02) (6.10) 
      
Finance 0.0496** 0.0489** 0.0477** 0.0473** 0.0499** 
 (2.18) (2.14) (2.09) (2.07) (2.20) 
      
Observations 665 665 665 665 665 
R
2
 0.941 0.941 0.941 0.941 0.941 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs and lagged by one year. The dependent variable is the log of the top 1% income share. Panel data OLS 
regressions with country and year fixed effects. Time span: 1979-2015. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are 
presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance. 
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TABLE A4 
Alternative measures of Innovation and Top 1% Income Share with clustered standard errors-OLS results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% 
Measures of Innovation Cit7 Grant Lag Renewal Patent Scope Many Fields 
Innovation -0.0237** -0.0256** -0.0266** -0.0267** -0.0273** 
 (-2.14) (-2.28) (-2.38) (-2.44) (-2.36) 
      
Popgr 0.0168 0.0166 0.0165 0.0170 0.0164 
 (0.74) (0.73) (0.72) (0.74) (0.71) 
      
Gvtsize -2.558** -2.550*** -2.541** -2.534*** -2.547*** 
 (-2.76) (-2.78) (-2.74) (-2.78) (-2.80) 
      
Unemployment 0.824 0.848 0.855 0.860 0.848 
 (1.24) (1.27) (1.28) (1.29) (1.27) 
      
Gdppc 0.263*** 0.275*** 0.281*** 0.281*** 0.278*** 
 (3.75) (3.85) (3.95) (4.05) (3.99) 
      
Finance 0.0496 0.0489 0.0477 0.0473 0.0499 
 (0.96) (0.94) (0.92) (0.91) (0.97) 
Observations 665 665 665 665 665 
R
2
 0.941 0.941 0.941 0.941 0.941 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs and lagged by one year. The dependent variable is the log of the top 1% income share. Panel data OLS regressions 
with country and year fixed effects. Time span: 1979-2015. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance. 
 
TABLE A5 
Innovation First Stage-IV Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Measures of Innovation Patents Cit5 Patents Cit5 Patents Cit5 
Spillover 0.118*** 0.270***   0.067*** 0.159*** 
 (6.77) (7.05)   (5.18) (4.98) 
       
Charges   0.130*** 0.396*** 0.174*** 0.450*** 
   (2.98) (4.27) (4.30) (5.07) 
       
Popgr 0.0160 0.0323 -0.0487 -0.0816 -0.070* -0.1247 
 (0.34) (0.33) (-1.24) (-0.88) (-1.67) (-1.32) 
Gvtsize 5.361*** 9.013** 5.359*** 11.440*** 5.508*** 11.014*** 
 (2.97) (2.28) (2.91) (2.88) (3.25) (3.00) 
       
Unemployment 3.627*** 7.098*** 6.527*** 12.824*** 6.012*** 11.104*** 
 (3.75) (3.19) (5.68) (4.96) (5.91) (4.78) 
Gdppc 2.602*** 5.307*** 3.649*** 7.515*** 3.349*** 6.875*** 
 (16.00) (14.50) (16.47) (15.79) (17.72) (16.11) 
       
Finance -0.0799 -.0223 0.1200 0.659*** 0.162* 0.759*** 
 (-1.02) (-0.12) (1.13) (2.72) (1.78) (3.65) 
       
Observations 641 641 512 512 495 495 
Groups 27 27 28 28 26 26 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs and lagged by one year. The dependent variable is the log of the top 1% income share. Panel data 2SLS regressions with 
country and year fixed effects. Time span: 1979-2014 for columns 1 and 2 and 1979-2012 for columns 3, 4, 5 and 6. First stage results of Spillover and 
Charges instrument on Innovation. The lag between our spillover instrument and our measures of innovation is set to one year and the lead between our 
instrument based on the charges and our measures of innovation is set to 3 years. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are 
presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance. 
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TABLE A6 
Innovation and Top 1% Income Share by splitting equally the quality measures 
 (2) (1) (4) (3) (6) (5) 
Dependent Variable Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% 
Measures of Innovation Cit5 Claims Cit5 Claims Cit5 Claims 
Innovation -0.0446*** -0.0423*** -0.0965*** -0.0939** -0.0495*** -0.0459*** 
 (-3.25) (-3.34) (-2.58) (-2.54) (-2.79) (-2.87) 
Popgr 0.00934 0.0112 -0.0182 -0.0176 -0.0142 -0.0138 
 (0.84) (0.97) (-1.52) (-1.51) (-1.37) (-1.32) 
Gvtsize -2.336*** -2.311*** -2.039*** -1.965*** -2.187*** -2.190*** 
 (-4.97) (-4.96) (-3.17) (-3.14) (-4.36) (-4.58) 
Unemployment 0.995*** 0.993*** 1.878*** 1.859*** 1.398*** 1.363*** 
 (3.52) (3.55) (2.75) (2.78) (3.27) (3.30) 
Gdppc 0.390*** 0.378*** 0.864*** 0.846*** 0.519*** 0.484*** 
 (4.50) (4.66) (2.93) (2.87) (3.54) (3.70) 
Finance 0.0341* 0.0313 0.0397 0.0267 0.00871 0.000649 
 (1.66) (1.51) (1.30) (0.93) (0.32) (0.02) 
Observations 641 641 512 512 495 495 
R
2
 0.692 0.698 0.621 0.650 0.730 0.742 
F-first stage 45.09 48.04 13.83 14.59 23.71 30.89 
Hansen - - - - 0.5611 0.5489 
Groups 27 27 28 28 26 26 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs and lagged by one year. The dependent variable is the log of the top 1% income share. Panel data 2SLS regressions with 
country and year fixed effects. Time span: 1979-2014 for columns 1 and 2 and 1979-2012 for columns 3, 4, 5 and 6. The lag between the spillover 
instrument and the endogenous variables is set to 1 year for columns 1 and 2 and the lead between the charges instrument and the endogenous variables is 
set to 3 years for columns 3 and 4. We apply both instruments in columns 5 and 6. Measures of innovation are equally split among inventors. 
Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of 
significance. 
TABLE A7 
Innovation and Top 1% Income Share Time Restrictions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% 
Measures of Innovation Patents Cit5 Claims Patents Cit5 Claims 
Innovation -0.0758** -0.0320** -0.0329** -0.0693* -0.0293* -0.0298* 
 (-2.15) (-2.14) (-2.17) (-1.68) (-1.66) (-1.69) 
Popgr 0.000898 0.00160 0.00129 0.00346 0.00362 0.00282 
 (0.08) (0.14) (0.11) (0.30) (0.32) (0.24) 
Gvtsize -2.388*** -2.444*** -2.472*** -2.137*** -2.193*** -2.186*** 
 (-4.89) (-5.07) (-5.19) (-4.11) (-4.24) (-4.26) 
Unemployment 0.817** 0.778** 0.762** 0.681** 0.638* 0.611* 
 (2.52) (2.44) (2.43) (1.99) (1.93) (1.90) 
Gdppc 0.390*** 0.364*** 0.361*** 0.395*** 0.376*** 0.370*** 
 (3.82) (4.00) (4.10) (3.57) (3.75) (3.89) 
Finance 0.0281 0.0332 0.0316 0.00961 0.0143 0.0128 
 (1.39) (1.64) (1.56) (0.50) (0.73) (0.66) 
Observations 568 568 568 537 537 537 
R
2
 0.653 0.653 0.656 0.627 0.628 0.632 
F-first stage 27.86 31.55 32.86 28.14 30.73 33.79 
Groups 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Notes: In this table we eliminate the common time periods between our instrument and our measure of innovation as a robustness check. Innovation is taken 
in logs and lagged by one year. The dependent variable is the log of the top 1% income share. Panel data 2SLS regressions with country and year fixed 
effects. Time span: 1985-2014 for columns 1, 2 and 3 and 1987-2014 for columns 4, 5 and 6. The lag between the spillover instrument and the endogenous 
variables is set to 1 year. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 
0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance. 
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TABLE A8 
Alternative measures of Innovation and Top 1% Income Share using Spillover Instrument-IV results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% 
Measures of Innovation Cit7 Grant Lag Renewal Patent Scope Many Field 
Innovation -0.0402*** -0.0431*** -0.0424*** -0.0416*** -0.0423*** 
 (-3.31) (-3.36) (-3.36) (-3.39) (-3.40) 
Popgr 0.0104 0.00973 0.00989 0.00978 0.00912 
 (0.97) (0.88) (0.90) (0.90) (0.85) 
Gvtsize -2.404*** -2.388*** -2.395*** -2.387*** -2.404*** 
 (-5.30) (-5.23) (-5.26) (-5.31) (-5.40) 
      
Unemployment 0.967*** 1.004*** 0.989*** 0.981*** 0.979*** 
 (3.51) (3.59) (3.55) (3.57) (3.58) 
      
Gdppc 0.370*** 0.390*** 0.386*** 0.379*** 0.373*** 
 (4.65) (4.63) (4.63) (4.70) (4.74) 
      
Finance 0.0335* 0.0321 0.0306 0.0293 0.0330 
 (1.65) (1.57) (1.49) (1.44) (1.63) 
Observations 641 641 641 641 641 
R
2
 0.700 0.700 0.701 0.703 0.703 
F-first stage 50.02 50.53 52.13 53.73 58.33 
Groups 27 27 27 27 27 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs and lagged by one year. The dependent variable is the log of the top 1% income share. Panel data 2SLS regressions with 
country and year fixed effects. Time span: 1979-2014. The lag between the spillover instrument and the endogenous variables is set to 1 year. 
Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of 
significance. 
TABLE A9 
Alternative measures of Innovation and Top 1% Income Share using Charges as an Instrument-IV results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% 
Measures of Innovation Cit7 Grant Lag Renewal Patent Scope Many Field 
Innovation -0.0790*** -0.0795*** -0.0795*** -0.0800*** -0.0909** 
 (-2.88) (-2.79) (-2.79) (-2.73) (-2.54) 
Popgr -0.0132 -0.0194 -0.0193* -0.0176 -0.0187 
 (-1.22) (-1.63) (-1.65) (-1.52) (-1.57) 
      
Gvtsize -2.158*** -2.225*** -2.209*** -2.224*** -2.159*** 
 (-3.89) (-4.22) (-4.13) (-4.24) (-3.82) 
      
Unemployment 1.596*** 1.611*** 1.597*** 1.635*** 1.762*** 
 (2.89) (2.88) (2.86) (2.87) (2.79) 
      
Gdppc 0.736*** 0.721*** 0.724*** 0.717*** 0.783*** 
 (3.34) (3.25) (3.25) (3.18) (2.91) 
      
Finance 0.0449 0.0306 0.0292 0.0272 0.0386 
 (1.57) (1.12) (1.08) (1.01) (1.30) 
Observations 512 512 512 512 512 
R
2
 0.671 0.684 0.688 0.682 0.661 
F-first stage 20.14 20.75 20.64 20.41 16.36 
Groups 28 28 28 28 28 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs and lagged by one year. The dependent variable is the log of the top 1% income share. Panel data 2SLS regressions with 
country and year fixed effects. Time span: 1979-2014. The lead between the instrument based on charges  and the endogenous variables is set to 3 years. 
Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of 
significance. 
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TABLE A10 
Innovation and Top Income Inequality controlling for truncation bias-IV results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% 
Measures Patents Cit5 Patents Cit5 Patents Cit5 Patents Cit5 
Innovation -0.0931*** -0.0400*** -0.251** -0.0841*** -0.0979*** -0.0420*** -0.218* -0.0795** 
 (-3.15) (-3.16) (-2.11) (-2.58) (-3.05) (-3.06) (-1.95) (-2.24) 
         
Popgr 0.00848 0.00849 -0.0205 -0.0163 0.0124 0.0102 -0.0228 -0.0227* 
 (0.73) (0.75) (-1.61) (-1.38) (0.89) (0.77) (-1.55) (-1.65) 
         
Gvtsize -2.311*** -2.457*** -1.870** -2.202*** -2.175*** -2.297*** -1.952*** -2.073*** 
 (-4.58) (-5.09) (-2.42) (-3.61) (-3.84) (-4.20) (-2.59) (-3.09) 
         
Unemployment 1.034*** 0.974*** 2.195** 1.643*** 1.010*** 0.922*** 1.920* 1.442** 
 (3.46) (3.32) (2.29) (2.62) (2.99) (2.78) (1.88) (1.96) 
         
Gdppc 0.402*** 0.374*** 1.060** 0.781*** 0.358*** 0.331*** 0.860* 0.669** 
 (4.35) (4.47) (2.29) (2.88) (3.53) (3.56) (1.91) (2.16) 
         
Finance 0.0274 0.0342 0.0200 0.0502 0.0326 0.0375 0.0239 0.0487 
 (1.28) (1.61) (0.60) (1.59) (1.16) (1.34) (0.62) (1.34) 
Observations 586 586 471 471 520 520 405 405 
R
2
 0.686 0.687 0.549 0.649 0.667 0.666 0.592 0.652 
F-first stage 43.49 48.93 7.97 16.39 38.83 44.90 8.70 14.35 
Groups 27 27 28 28 27 27 26 26 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs and lagged by one year. The dependent variable is the log of the top 1% income share. Panel data 2SLS regressions with 
country and year fixed effects. Time span: 1979-2010 for columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 1979-2007 for columns 5, 6, 7, 8. The spillover instrument is used in columns 
1, 2 and 5, 6 and the charges instrument in columns 3, 4 and 7, 8. The lag between the spillover instrument and the endogenous variables is set to 1 year and 
the lead between the charges instrument and endogenous variables is set to 3 years. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are 
presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance. 
 
TABLE A11 
Claims and Different Measures of Inequality using Spillover Instrument-IV results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables Top10% Top1% Top0.5% Gini 
Claims -0.0125* -0.0403*** -0.0270* -0.0149*** 
 (-1.70) (-3.36) (-1.71) (-4.12) 
Popgr -0.00890 0.0110 -0.00318 0.00537 
 (-1.40) (0.96) (-0.23) (1.41) 
Gvtsize -0.290 -2.379*** -2.494*** -0.443*** 
 (-1.23) (-5.23) (-4.52) (-4.02) 
Unemployment 0.875*** 0.949*** 0.624* 0.691*** 
 (6.12) (3.45) (1.88) (7.61) 
Gdppc 0.191*** 0.370*** 0.285*** 0.102*** 
 (4.02) (4.71) (2.65) (4.33) 
Finance 0.00839 0.0319 -0.0288 0.0501*** 
 (0.67) (1.56) (-1.03) (8.55) 
Observations 619 641 552 825 
R
2
 0.639 0.700 0.699 0.456 
F-first stage 45.61 51.53 41.96 89.01 
Groups 25 27 25 28 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs and lagged by one year. The dependent variables are the log of different measures of inequality. 
Panel data 2SLS regressions with country and year fixed effects. Time span: 1979-2014 for columns 1, 2, 3 and 1979-2015 for 
column 4. The lag between the spillover instrument and the endogenous variables is set to 1 year. Autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels 
of significance. 
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Supplementary Appendix 
 
 
TABLE S1 
Share of applications for every country in Database 2 
 
Code Share  Code Share 
AR 0.03%  JP 19.80% 
AU 0.67%  KR 3.09% 
BR 0.13%  LB 0.00% 
CA 1.55%  MU 0.00% 
CH 2.29%  MY 0.03% 
CN 1.66%  NL 2.47% 
CO 0.01%  NZ 0.12% 
DE 18.93%  PT 0.06% 
DK 0.75%  RU 0.24% 
ES 0.84%  SE 1.71% 
FR 6.45%  SG 0.17% 
GB 4.53%  TR 0.13% 
IE 0.20%  US 30.68% 
IN 0.55%  ZA 0.09% 
IT 2.82%  
  
Notes: LB has 146 patents and MU has 24 patents. Time Period: 1978-2015 
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TABLE S2 
Innovation and Top 1% Income Share - Full sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% 
Measure of Innovation Patents Cit5 Claims Generality Family 
Innovation -0.110*** -0.0443*** -0.0450*** -0.0456*** -0.0466*** 
 (-2.84) (-2.91) (-2.90) (-2.83) (-2.90) 
      
Popgr -0.0185 -0.0166 -0.0182 -0.0170 -0.0189 
 (-1.63) (-1.49) (-1.57) (-1.49) (-1.64) 
      
Gvtsize -2.117*** -2.252*** -2.214*** -2.238*** -2.188*** 
 (-4.41) (-4.89) (-4.78) (-4.85) (-4.68) 
      
Unemployment 1.352*** 1.228*** 1.295*** 1.253*** 1.222*** 
 (3.39) (3.30) (3.38) (3.35) (3.27) 
      
Gdppc 0.544*** 0.482*** 0.486*** 0.463*** 0.480*** 
 (3.61) (3.78) (3.81) (3.77) (3.77) 
      
Finance -0.00105 0.0138 0.00765 0.00985 0.00294 
 (-0.04) (0.51) (0.29) (0.37) (0.11) 
      
Observations 495 495 495 495 495 
R
2
 0.746 0.750 0.749 0.751 0.748 
F-first stage 32.86 34.99 39.79 41.04 38.65 
Hansen p-value 0.4529 0.5453 0.5547 0.4056 0.5711 
Groups 26 26 26 26 26 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs and lagged by one year. The dependent variable is the log of the top 1% income share. Panel data 2SLS regressions 
with country and year fixed effects. Time span: 1979-2012. The lag between the spillover instrument and the endogenous variables is set to 1 and the 
lead between the charges instrument and the endogenous variables is set to 3 years. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are 
presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance. 
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TABLE S3 
Share of patents for every country in Database 3 
Code Share  Code Share 
AR 0.03%  JP 17.91% 
AU 0.73%  KR 2.48% 
BR 0.11%  LB 0.00% 
CA 1.37%  MU 0.00% 
CH 3.91%  MY 0.03% 
CN 1.24%  NL 3.58% 
CO 0.01%  NZ 0.12% 
DE 19.21%  PT 0.05% 
DK 0.84%  RU 0.15% 
ES 0.78%  SE 2.27% 
FR 7.83%  SG 0.16% 
GB 4.57%  TR 0.13% 
IE 0.27%  US 28.61% 
IN 0.24%  ZA 0.11% 
IT 3.27%  
  Notes: LB has 49 patents and MU has 137 patents. Patents have been allocated based on their 
applicants. Time Period: 1978-2015 
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TABLE S4 
Measures of Innovation and Top 1% Income Share allocation by applicants  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% Top1% 
Measures of Innovation Patents Cit5 Claims Generality Family 
Innovation -0.0934*** -0.0428*** -0.0405*** -0.0443*** -0.0412*** 
 (-2.92) (-2.81) (-2.95) (-2.90) (-2.94) 
      
Popgr -0.0175 -0.0175 -0.0159 -0.0169 -0.0178 
 (-1.36) (-1.31) (-1.24) (-1.28) (-1.39) 
      
Gvtsize -2.121*** -2.087*** -2.205*** -2.217*** -2.177*** 
 (-4.18) (-3.91) (-4.54) (-4.54) (-4.39) 
      
Unemployment 1.520*** 1.459*** 1.450*** 1.447*** 1.398*** 
 (3.62) (3.54) (3.62) (3.62) (3.57) 
      
Gdppc 0.494*** 0.463*** 0.437*** 0.437*** 0.440*** 
 (3.78) (3.70) (3.96) (3.95) (3.91) 
      
Finance -0.0170 -0.0103 -0.0135 -0.00845 -0.0178 
 (-0.65) (-0.39) (-0.52) (-0.32) (-0.68) 
      
Observations 493 493 493 493 493 
R
2
 0.739 0.732 0.744 0.743 0.740 
F-first stage 41.08 29.91 49.09 43.89 46.86 
Hansen p-value 0.9497 0.9841 0.9423 0.8367 0.9538 
Groups 26 26 26 26 26 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs and lagged by one year. The dependent variable is the log of the top 1% income share. Panel data 2SLS regressions 
with country and year fixed effects. Time span: 1979-2012. The lag between the spillover instrument and the endogenous variables is set to 1 and the 
lead between the charges instrument and the endogenous variables is set to 3 years. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are 
presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance. 
 
 
 
 
 
